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Abstract The historical causes of russia’s conflict with Europe have not been settled 
and continue to threaten the stability of the old Continent. as the last empire of Europe, 
russia is undergoing a painful transformation and disintegration, leading to aggres-
sive foreign policy measures. previous western attempts to democratise russia have 
proven fruitless. Bearing this unsuccessful experience in mind, it seems that the most 
plausible option to ensure russia’s further development as a European democracy 
is to make ukraine an economic, political and social success story—a role model for 
russian society that will work as a catalyst for bottom-up democratic changes in the 
country. in order to help russia transform in the long run, the west must first concen-
trate on helping ukraine by providing the country with real military guarantees, sufficient 
economic support for the implementation of structural reforms and an adequate level of 
geopolitical engagement, including the prospect of Eu membership.
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Introduction
Europe has gone through paramount difficulties and tragedies throughout the twentieth 
century, dealing with two world wars, the Holocaust, the existence of gulags and tens 
of millions of deaths. after the end of the Cold war, Europe stepped into the twenty-first 
century with faith in its guarantees of peaceful prospects. unfortunately, recent years 
have demonstrated that these guarantees are not as reliable as previously thought.
russian president Vladimir putin has engaged in another aggressive foreign policy 
adventure, this time in ukraine. This has brought back the nightmares of the twentieth 
century, prompting experts to discuss the possibility of a Third world war (Lucas 2015) 
and to portray the prospect of a nuclear conflict as entirely likely (Fisher 2015). intimi-
dating as it may sound, this is the reality of the situation. The western community can-
not escape it by burying its head in the sand and shying away from openly responding 
to the pressing geopolitical questions at hand.
in this article i will briefly discuss the origins of the ‘russian problem’ and its effects 
on the state’s foreign policy, describe the phase of development that russia is currently 
undergoing, and provide the readers with guidelines on the actions that the western 
community should take in order to help both ukraine and russia move forward suc-
cessfully on the European path.
A fundamental challenge for the US and the EU: 
the unresolved ‘Russian problem’
The nightmares of the twentieth century were determined by two major factors. The first 
was comprised of two ‘tectonic’ conflicts: between Germany on one side and the rest of 
Europe on the other, and between an imperial russia (the Soviet union) and Europe. 
The second factor was the enduring isolationist politics of the uS, leading to its unwill-
ingness to assume leadership, both in consolidating European efforts and in stabilising 
Europe while securing freedom and democracy.
after the Second world war, the uS significantly altered its foreign policy course from 
isolationism to ‘forced engagement’ in world affairs in the face of the rising Communist 
threat. Together with other European leaders, the uS managed to eliminate the princi-
pal causes of the ‘German conflict’ by establishing what later came to be known as the 
European union and by implementing the Marshall plan, thereby laying the foundations 
for a stable, peaceful, democratic and thriving Europe.
However the reasons for russia’s conflict with Europe have not been removed to this 
day and it is these that are determining russia’s current behaviour and the ensuing 
277
 EuropEan ViEw (2015) 14:275–283
1 3
threat it poses to the whole of Europe and the rest of the world. The main reason for 
this situation is the fact that russia still cannot be regarded as a democratic European 
country. on the contrary, russia may fairly be called the last empire of the old Conti-
nent, and it is undergoing a painful process of disintegration and internal transformation.
russian history demonstrates that it has always been a typical feature of russia to 
repeat, with considerable delay, what has previously—several decades or even cen-
turies before—happened elsewhere in Europe. The only difference is that in russia’s 
case, it usually happens on a far more radical level. in this case, the British and French 
Empires were the last in western Europe to collapse after the Second world war, while 
the russian Empire did not start crumbling until as late as 1990—in a process that has 
still not finished.
What is currently happening?
painting in broad strokes, i will try to provide a picture of what is currently happening on 
the eastern fringes of Europe. Then i will concentrate on what actions need to be taken 
on both sides of the atlantic to mitigate this alarming situation.
First of all, what we are witnessing today is a continuation of the collapse of the rus-
sian Empire, which began in 1990. The disintegration process took a new turn on the 
Maidan, and now putin is doing what he can to stop the accelerated dismantlement of 
the remaining empire. He may be able to delay this inevitable historical process, spilling 
a lot of blood in the process, but it will continue to evolve regardless of his actions.
Second, my personal prediction is that putin will stay in power as long as his physical 
condition allows him to. in the current circumstances, this could be the next 20 years. 
This means that russian policies will continue on the same path and that the economic 
and social conditions in the country will deteriorate further. and this, in turn, means that 
putin will inevitably look for new opportunities to demonstrate aggressive behaviour in 
order to maintain his domestic popularity.
Third, so far all western attempts to stimulate democratic development in russia 
from the outside have been unsuccessful and are bound to remain so during putin’s 
reign. The clearest example of this is probably the politically motivated murder of the 
well-known opposition figure Boris nemtsov in February 2015, which symbolises the 
regime’s increasing hold over the remaining democratic opposition.
neither Germany’s Eastern policy, nor washington’s ‘reset’, engagement or appease-
ment policies; strategic partnership; or partnership for modernisation have brought 
about visible, positive changes in russia. Continuing the same policies while putin is 
still in power would be naïvely irresponsible. what is more, it would be criminally neg-
ligent to agree to russia’s demands to allow it to have zones of strategic interest with 
special rights to handle everything within them in the way it sees fit (Buckley and Hille 
2015).
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Fourth, bearing in mind all the previously unsuccessful attempts to effect change in 
russia, the action most likely to positively influence developments there is the positive 
and successful development of ukraine, along with opening up the possibility of the 
country integrating into the Eu. in other words, the western community’s assistance 
in bringing about positive economic, political and social changes in ukraine will also 
encourage similar developments in russia in the longer term.
Fifth, this is exactly why putin is pursuing a long-term strategy of preventing ukraine 
from reform, because a successful ukraine poses the biggest threat to putin’s klep-
tocratic regime (Dawisha 2014). This strategy implies that the aggression in Eastern 
ukraine is more about creating chaos and an economic and political crisis, and stimu-
lating public dissatisfaction than about physically occupying new territories—putin’s 
primary goal is to create another ‘frozen conflict’ that would severely hinder ukraine’s 
ambitions, such as joining the Eu.
Finally, the western community must have its own long-term strategy to prevent putin 
from successfully implementing his plans in ukraine. That is why assisting ukraine is 
of crucial importance for the whole western world rather than just for ukraine, as this 
is the best way in which, in the longer perspective, to stabilise russia. and russia will 
only become stable when it is transformed into a European country—in terms of its 
actions and principles, not just in terms of geography. Thus the war in ukraine is to 
be fought not only for the freedom of that country, but also for the sake of this kind of 
future in russia and for the sake of ending the last ‘tectonic’ conflict between russia 
and Europe.
Misinterpretations of Russia
The western community has apparently forgotten the key lesson of the tragedies of the 
twentieth century: that aggressive rogue states are most provoked by a weak response 
to actions that breach international norms and agreements, rather than the opposite.
as the west watches russia’s aggression unfold in ukraine, it is still having doubts 
about whether its response should be strong and unambiguous. Some of the larger Eu 
capitals are afraid that a strong response might provoke even harsher russian aggres-
sion. This is a misguided approach. a weak western response, that allows russia to 
draw red lines around its areas of interest as it pleases, is exactly what most encour-
ages and continues to provoke russia’s aggressive behaviour.
politicians in some western capitals also do not seem to understand the geopoliti-
cal importance of what is being dealt with in ukraine. Both the uS administration and 
the majority of European leaders still believe that it is only ukraine’s fate that is being 
decided. what many do not realise is that it is also russia’s future and path of further 
development that are being decided in ukraine. The western response is still reactive, 
responding to russia’s actions, rather than proactive, dictating the region’s agenda.
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What should we do?
at the moment, we need to show putin that his military strategy to create chaos in 
ukraine is no longer going to succeed. we immediately need to start using a much 
more precise political language when we are referring to the aggression in ukraine. we 
should stop calling it ‘the crisis in ukraine’ or ‘the ukrainian crisis’. rather, we should 
call it precisely what it is: ‘putin’s war’. we now are into the second decade of putin’s 
wars: first there was the war in Chechnya, then in Georgia and now in ukraine.
if we start using such precise language, we will immediately face up to the reality, 
which is that ukraine is defending itself against the entire military might of russia. when 
putin is facing a much weaker opponent, as ukraine is today, he moves forward without 
hesitation. That is why we need to realise that the responsibility to stop putin’s aggres-
sion lies on the shoulders of the western community.
‘Gangster wars’
on this note, i would like to share some of my personal experience. in 2010, when i 
was serving as the prime minister of Lithuania, i had the chance to have an unofficial 
meeting with putin, then prime minister of russia. after the meeting i was left with the 
impression that putin was the type of person i was used to encountering in my younger 
days. in Vilnius, where i grew up, we had a district around red army avenue where 
young russian-speaking gangsters loved to demonstrate that they were stronger than 
anybody else. putin reminded me completely of those local young gangsters.
as youngsters, what we learned from our experience in Vilnius was quite clear: you 
could not negotiate with the guys from the local gangs. if you tried to negotiate with 
them, they would immediately perceive this as a sign of weakness, and they would 
make a move. The only effective tactics were to beat them back, call the local police or 
run away.
what putin is doing in ukraine is not special or new. when we give it a complicated 
name—‘hybrid warfare’—we are moving away from reality. and the reality is that putin 
is fighting a ‘gangster war’ in which one will either need to fight back or call the police, 
or one will be beaten up, robbed or even murdered. what one cannot do is show weak-
ness—by employing statements such as ‘there is no military solution’, or by trying to 
negotiate while being much weaker than the enemy. if putin believes that ukraine will 
not be assisted by the uS administration providing the needed weapons or threatening 
stronger sanctions, then it will only be a matter of time before putin moves on Mariupol, 
Kharkiv or odesa.
That is why it is so important to demonstrate to putin that he is no longer the stronger 
party in ukraine. This is the responsibility of the whole western community, not just 
president poroshenko. Let us not run away from our responsibility to stop this ‘gangster 
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war’. we have to make a simple choice, without removing the possibility of implement-
ing a SwiFT banking ban on russia or providing Javelin anti-tank missiles to ukrainian 
military forces, and make it clear to putin without waiting for his next move.
Saving Ukraine
as noted above, putin has a long-term strategy to prevent ukraine from reforming, 
developing a prosperous economy and integrating into the Eu, because ukraine’s suc-
cess in these areas would set a positive example for the russian nation and would be 
very dangerous for the survival of the Kremlin’s regime. That is why it is so important to 
assist ukraine, not only in defence matters but also in the implementation of the neces-
sary reforms and the stabilisation of the economic situation.
over the last several months, i have frequently visited ukraine to advise the govern-
ment on their reform agenda, based on my experience in Lithuania. From a political 
perspective, ukraine is at the same point as the Baltic states were at the beginning 
of the 1990s. one could even joke that the real European-style reforms in our region 
only begin when the monuments of Lenin have been removed throughout the country, 
as happened in the Baltics in the early 1990s and as has started to happen in ukraine 
since the events on the Maidan.
ukraine is looking like a real post-revolutionary country, with a lot of young and well-
educated professionals in the government and plenty of romantic idealism, but with a 
large deficit in political experience that is hindering political coordination between the 
different institutions and stakeholders.
Reforming Ukraine
Judging from my experience of reforms in Lithuania, i believe that suitable conditions 
exist in ukraine for the effective implementation of an ambitious reform agenda. in order 
to push forward major structural change, two important factors need to be brought into 
play: there needs to be a good team of reformers (already present in the current gov-
ernment), and there needs to be a good level of crisis (of which there is too much).
The ukrainians have already started pushing through major reforms. The govern-
ment is currently abolishing the huge energy subsidies, which stood at a total of around 
10 % of GDp when reforms in the sector started (aslund 2014), and is also starting to 
implement crucial reforms in the management of state-owned enterprises. Both of these 
reforms will diminish the room for oligarchic corruption. in addition, police reforms are 
also taking place (in July, at least in Kyiv, modern police forces started operating on the 
streets), and an anti-corruption bureau and an office of the business ombudsman have 
been created in order to fight corruption in a more efficient way and increase the level of 
public trust in the state authorities and institutions.
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Thus the government in ukraine is not only fighting putin’s war but is also imple-
menting major structural reforms, which will form the foundations needed to transform 
ukraine into a European-style democracy with an open economy.
However, there are a lot of problems concerning the implementation of these essen-
tial reforms. There is an evident lack of political experience, a shortage of skills in stra-
tegic political communication, a deficit of traditions of effective cooperation between the 
government and the parliament, and a scarcity of clear party structures inside the coali-
tion. These factors are creating a lot of political chaos, which could very easily cause 
real political instability for the ruling coalition.
EU membership prospects
The western community must assist ukraine in implementing the ambitious reforms 
that it has decided to undertake. in the middle of the 1990s, when the Baltic states were 
undergoing similar reforms, our countries received effective assistance from the west, 
not only in the form of expert advice but, most importantly, in the form of a clear political 
promise of future membership of the Eu and naTo if we implemented all the necessary 
reforms to transform ourselves into a European democracy with an operating market 
economy. This promise kept us on track, despite all the political mistakes we made.
what is now needed is a very clear political statement from the Eu’s leadership, 
declaring that ukraine also has such membership prospects. we are all aware that this 
is not an easy task to achieve. we unfortunately missed a good opportunity during the 
2015 Eastern partnership Summit in riga, mainly because of a lack of western unity 
and leadership, combined with the enduring futile efforts to appease russia.
alongside the prospects of Eu membership, ukraine needs its own ‘Marshall plan’, a 
true financial assistance plan. in the Eu we are spending hundreds of billions of euros 
on rescuing Greece, while, in comparison, ukraine looks like it has been abandoned, 
despite the fact that it is the ultimate front line against russia’s revived revanchism, 
which is threatening the future and stability of the whole European project, not just 
ukraine.
in order to avoid requesting more taxpayers’ money for this financial assistance, the 
Eu could reallocate funds from its 2014–20 financial framework. During this period, the 
Eu has agreed to use a total of around 1 trillion euros for various purposes; Lithuania 
alone will receive around 10 billion euros of that amount (European Commission 2014). 
if the member states of the Eu could agree to reallocate just 3 % of the total funds for 
a new Marshall plan for ukraine, we could create a financial instrument worth 30 billion 
euros. in this scenario, Lithuania would still receive around 9.7 billion euros (instead of 
10 billion euros). This would probably not be a tragic development for the countries of 
the Eu and at the same time would constitute a reasonable and timely investment in the 
geopolitical security of the whole of the Eu.
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Therefore, in my view, based on our experience in Lithuania, ukraine can still become a 
successful country with a European democracy and an effective market economy. ukrain-
ians need to believe that they can achieve this goal. Likewise, we need to do our part and 
the ukrainians want to see proof that we will deliver. So let us do what we need to do.
Action plan
all in all, this is what the west needs to do in order to enhance the security of ukraine 
and Europe as a whole:
•  we need to show putin that from a military point of view, he is no longer the 
stronger party in ukraine;
•  we need to use our expertise to assist ukraine with the implementation of struc-
tural reforms;
•  we need to offer a clear promise concerning ukraine’s future prospects for Eu 
membership; and
•  we need to create a special ‘Marshall plan’ for ukraine to ensure sufficient funding.
Evidently, this agenda is not a very large one: it contains only four general actions 
that the western community must execute if it is to stay united in the face of the new 
threats of the twenty-first century.
Conclusion
we have the opportunity not only to transform ukraine into a European country, but 
also to create the conditions for the development of a European-style russia and to 
offer a positive example for the other countries of Eastern Europe and the South Cau-
casus. The Europeanisation of russia begins with success in ukraine. Together we can 
deliver such a success. But this will require organic leadership from the uS and the Eu 
to assist ukraine and, at the same time, to help russia in the longer term, which should 
be regarded as the fundamental geopolitical challenge of the early twenty-first century. 
There is no better way to ensure that russia becomes a European-style democracy in 
the long term than by assisting ukraine today.
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